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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal from 
a judgment of conviction and sentence entered against appellant 
Matthew Kluger on June 4, 2012, in which Kluger challenges 
only his sentence.  The government initiated this criminal case 
on April 5, 2011, when it filed a complaint against Kluger and 
Garrett Bauer in the District Court.
1
  The government charged 
Kluger and Bauer as conspirators in a three-man insider-trading 
scheme in which Kenneth Robinson was the third participant.  
The conspiracy spanned 17 years and, so far as is known, 
constituted the longest such scheme in United States history.   
 On December 14, 2011, Kluger entered a guilty plea to a 
four-count information charging him with (1) conspiracy to 
commit securities fraud; (2) securities fraud; (3) conspiracy to 
commit money laundering; and (4) obstruction of justice, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff(a), 
and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), 18 U.S.C. § 
1512(c)(2), and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  Kluger pled guilty pursuant to a 
plea agreement which did not include a stipulation as to his 
guidelines sentencing range.  On June 4, 2012, the District Court 
sentenced Kluger to a 60-month custodial term on Count I and 
144-month custodial terms on each of Counts II, III, and IV, all 
four terms to be served concurrently, for a total custodial term of 
                                                 
1
 On December 8, 2011, Bauer entered a guilty plea.  The 
District Court sentenced him on June 4, 2012, following which 
he filed an appeal but we have affirmed the judgment in his 
case.  See United States v. Bauer, No. 12-2754.   
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144 months (12 years), a term thought to be the longest insider-
trading sentence ever imposed.  The sentence included a $400 
special assessment, a three-year term of supervised release to 
follow the custodial term, and occupational restrictions relating 
to Kluger‟s employment in the securities industry.       
 Following a separate hearing on the same day, the 
District Court sentenced Bauer to a 60-month custodial term on 
Count I and 108-month custodial terms on each of Counts II, III, 
and IV, all four terms to be served concurrently, for a total 
custodial term of 108 months (9 years).  Bauer‟s sentence also 
included a $400 special assessment, a three-year term of 
supervised release, and occupational restrictions.   
 On April 11, 2011, Robinson, the third conspirator who 
was the “middleman,” in the insider-trading scheme because 
Kluger passed inside information to him and he, in turn, relayed 
the information to Bauer who executed the trades, pled guilty to 
a three-count information for securities fraud.  The District 
Court on June 5, 2011, sentenced Robinson to concurrent 27-
month custodial terms on all three counts for a total custodial 
term of 27 months to be followed by a three-year term of 
supervised release.  The Court also included a $300 special 
assessment in Robinson‟s sentence.  Robinson‟s sentence was 
far below his guidelines range of 70 to 87 months but the Court 
based it in part on a motion that the government filed pursuant 
to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 seeking a downwards departure from his 
guidelines sentencing range because Robinson was cooperating 
with the government in its investigation and prosecution of the 
conspiracy involved in this case.  Robinson has not appealed 
from the sentence.  
  5 
 On June 13, 2012, Kluger filed a timely appeal, raising 
the following arguments.  First, he challenges the District 
Court‟s calculation of his sentencing guidelines range.  Second, 
he contends that the Court procedurally erred in imposing the 
sentence on him by (1) improperly denying him an evidentiary 
hearing prior to his sentencing; (2) failing to resolve his 
objections to the presentence investigation report; and (3) not 
ordering discovery of materials that the government turned over 
to the probation department for use in preparing the presentence 
report.  Finally, he contends that the District Court imposed a 
procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentence.
2
   
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 The insider-trading scheme began in the summer of 1994 
and, as we have indicated, involved three individuals: Kluger, 
Bauer, and Robinson.  When the parties to the conspiracy 
initiated their scheme, Kluger had finished his second year of 
law school at New York University and was working as a 
summer associate at the New York law firm of Cravath, Swaine 
                                                 
2
 Kluger also argues that if we remand the case for resentencing 
we should direct that the case be reassigned from the original 
judge to a different judge but inasmuch as we are affirming the 
sentence the reassignment issue is moot and we do not further 
discuss it.  Significantly, though Kluger asks that this case be 
reassigned on the remand he seeks he does not seek a new 
sentencing on the ground that the judge was biased against him. 
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& Moore.  Kluger knew Robinson from their prior employment 
at a New York real estate company and Bauer knew Robinson 
from their prior employment at a venture capital firm in New 
York.
3
  Although the conspirators dispute whether Kluger first 
approached Robinson, or vice versa, they agree that Kluger 
served as the sole source of the inside information involved in 
the conspiracy.   
 Beginning as a summer associate and then continuing as 
a full-time associate after law school, Kluger passed along 
material, nonpublic information concerning mergers and 
acquisitions to Robinson who then gave that information to 
Bauer, who as a professional stock trader used it to execute 
trades on behalf of the three conspirators.
4
  Robinson instructed 
Bauer on how many shares to purchase for him and for Kluger, 
intending to keep the purchases to a modest volume to avoid 
drawing attention to the conspirators‟ activities.  Nevertheless, 
                                                 
3
 In his sentencing memorandum in the District Court, Bauer 
explained that he “met Matt [Kluger] only once long before the 
conspiracy started, and recalls speaking with him on the 
telephone only briefly on perhaps one occasion during the 17-
year period of the conspiracy.”    
 
4
 The law firms employing Kluger gave him training concerning 
inside trading and repeatedly required him to sign internal law 
firm policy statements prohibiting him from engaging in such 
trading.  There is no suggestion in the record that any attorney or 
employee of any of the firms that employed Kluger other than 
Kluger himself was involved in the inside trading. 
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Bauer deviated from Robinson‟s instructions by trading in share 
volumes far in excess of the number of shares that the three 
conspirators agreed would be traded.
5
  This excess trading, 
though originally greatly enhancing Bauer‟s trading profits, 
likely was a catastrophic mistake as it well may have triggered 
the investigation into the conspirators‟ activities.  Neither Bauer 
nor Robinson informed Kluger of the extent of Bauer‟s trading.  
In executing his trades, Bauer followed the practice of 
purchasing the shares based on Kluger‟s information before the 
information became public and then selling the shares after the 
announcement.  Following successful trades, Bauer would make 
withdrawals from multiple ATM machines and then give 
Robinson cash, minus capital gains taxes, to cover the payments 
to Robinson and Kluger.
6
   
The first phase of the scheme continued through 2002 
and involved inside information related to approximately 20 
corporate transactions resulting in profits of $13,026,904.  
During that period, Kluger moved from one law firm to the next. 
 Thus, following his employment at Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 
                                                 
5
 There is some dispute as to the existence and terms of the 
agreement but on this appeal we accept Kluger‟s contention that 
Bauer greatly exceeded the limitations on which the conspirators 
agreed with respect to the number of shares that would be 
traded. 
 
6
 We are not suggesting that Kluger did not receive taxable 
income on the money paid to him merely because Bauer may 
have paid taxes on all of the conspirators‟ gains as that issue is 
not before us. 
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Kluger obtained a position with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher 
& Flom which employed him for approximately three years in 
its New York and Palo Alto offices.  Thereafter Fried, Frank, 
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson employed Kluger for approximately 
one year in its New York office.  In the late 1990s, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission began investigating some of the 
conspirators‟ trades.  By 2002, the scheme went on hiatus while 
Kluger worked for Sills, Cummis, Epstein & Gross and then 
served as an in-house counsel for a corporation, two places of 
employment at which Bauer did not gain information useful for 
inside trading.  The second phase of the scheme started when 
Kluger joined the Washington, D.C. office of Wilson, Sonsini, 
Goodrich & Rosati as a senior associate in December 2005 and 
this phase continued throughout his tenure at that firm for more 
than five years.  Although in some cases the insider trading led 
to losses, overall the insider-trading scheme made substantial 
profits.
7
   
During the second phase of the insider-trading scheme, 
Kluger provided inside information regarding 13 transactions.  
Presentence Report (“PSR”) ¶ 49.  Relying on that information, 
Bauer wagered approximately $124 million through his trading 
accounts and realized $34,465,343 in gross profits.  Id. ¶ 98.  
The insider-trading profits allowed Bauer to purchase a $6.65 
million apartment in Manhattan and an $875,000 home in 
                                                 
7
 The presentence report describes Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, Fried, Frank, Harris, 
Shriver & Jacobson, and Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati as 
“four of the largest and most prominent mergers and acquisition 
law firms in the United States.”  PSR ¶ 13.  
  9 
Florida.  Id. ¶ 88.  The conspirators took extra precautions 
during the second phase of the scheme to avoid detection, 
especially when they learned in or around 2007 that their trading 
activities had come to the attention of civil regulators.  Kluger, 
for example, only misused information related to transactions on 
which he was not working during his employment at Wilson, 
Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati.  Moreover, the conspirators started 
to use pay phones and “throwaway” prepaid cellular phones for 
their communications and Robinson kept some of the illicit cash 
in safe deposit boxes.  In spite of the conspirators‟ steps to avoid 
detection, their activities were uncovered and FBI and IRS 
agents executed a search warrant at Robinson‟s home on March 
8, 2011, in furtherance of the investigation.  Id. ¶ 53.  The agents 
inquired about the suspicious trades in his and Bauer‟s accounts 
as well as Robinson‟s “structuring” activities by making 
deposits under the $10,000 mandatory reporting threshold.   
Following the execution of the warrant, Robinson called 
Bauer and Kluger separately to inform them of the search and 
ongoing investigation.  In the following weeks, unbeknownst to 
Bauer and Kluger, Robinson began cooperating with the 
government and recording his separate phone conversations with 
them.  The incriminating conversations not only implicated the 
parties based on their past conduct but also revealed their plans 
to obstruct justice by destroying key evidence, such as cell 
phones and computers, and by agreeing not to cooperate with 
the government.  A bizarre example of their attempts to obstruct 
justice was Bauer‟s proposal that Robinson burn $175,000 in 
cash obtained in the latest ATM withdrawals to eliminate 
Bauer‟s fingerprints, or, alternatively, to run the cash through a 
washing machine, a suggestion that gives a new and literal 
  10 
meaning to the term “money laundering.”    
During this cover-up phase of the conspiracy, Kluger 
emphasized that he was not going to cooperate with the 
government because he knew he never would get a good deal 
due to his role as the source of the inside information.  On April 
6, 2011, federal agents arrested Bauer and Kluger.  Five days 
later, federal agents arrested Robinson, who pled guilty that 
same day.   
 
III. JURISDICTION 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Sentencing 
 1. Sentencing Guidelines Calculation 
 On appeal, “[w]e review the District Court‟s 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, and 
scrutinize any findings of fact for clear error.”  United States v. 
Aquino, 555 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations 
omitted).  But “[w]e review the District Court‟s application of 
the Guidelines to facts for abuse of discretion.”  United States v. 
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Tupone, 442 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); see 
also Aquino, 555 F.3d at 127 n.5 (“[T]he appropriate standard 
when reviewing a district court‟s application of law to fact is 
due deference.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  
  The first step of the three-step sentencing process 
requires a district court to calculate a defendant‟s guidelines 
sentencing range in the same way that it would have made its 
calculations prior to the Supreme Court‟s decision in United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), in which 
the Court determined that the guidelines would have only an 
advisory status.  See United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 
(3d Cir. 2006).  Kluger argues that the District Court improperly 
used U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 (“Insider Trading”) exclusively for 
calculating the gain attributable to him for the purposes of 
sentencing, thereby ignoring U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (“Relevant 
Conduct”).  Under § 2B1.4, the District Court attributed all of 
the scheme‟s monetary gain to Kluger even though his share of 
the profits was far less than Bauer‟s share when Bauer was 
trading on Kluger‟s information.8  Of course, the attribution of 
gains to a defendant can be critical in a guidelines sentencing 
range calculation for in general, within ranges of gains, the 
larger the gain attributable to a defendant the higher his 
sentencing range will be. 
                                                 
8
 The District Court also attributed Robinson‟s trading gains to 
Kluger, but these gains were minimal in comparison to Bauer‟s 
gains.  The fact that profits are attributable to one conspirator in 
guidelines calculations does not mean that the same gains cannot 
be attributed to another conspirator as well.   
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  We interpret and apply the guidelines as written.  See 
United States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation 
omitted).  Therefore, “[a]s with statutory language, the plain and 
unambiguous language of the Sentencing Guidelines affords the 
best recourse
9
 for their proper interpretation.”  Id. (citations 
omitted).  The Supreme Court has explained “that commentary 
in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a guideline 
is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal 
statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, 
that guideline.”10  Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 
S.Ct. 1913, 1915 (1993).  With those holdings in mind, we 
examine the guidelines text and applicable commentary.
11
     
                                                 
9
 The word “recourse” appears in the original opinion.  We 
believe that the Court may have intended to say “resource.”   
 
10
 In Stinson v. United States the Supreme Court explained that 
the commentary not only clarifies the guidelines but also 
“provides concrete guidance as to how even unambiguous 
guidelines are to be applied in practice.”  508 U.S. 36, 44, 113 
S.Ct. 1913, 1918 (1993).  Though the guidelines are no longer 
mandatory, we still look to the commentary when we calculate 
the guideline sentence as we would have pre-Booker. 
 
11
 The District Court used the November 1, 2011 edition of the 
Guidelines Manual in Kluger‟s sentencing as that edition was in 
effect at the time of the sentencing and there were no ex-post 
facto concerns in this case by reason of amendment of the 
guidelines after Kluger committed his offenses barring the use 
of that edition.  Therefore, the Supreme Court‟s recent holding 
  13 
  As applicable in this case the insider-trading guideline, 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4, states: 
  (a) Base Offense Level: 8 
  (b) Specific Offense Characteristics  
(1) If the gain resulting from the offense exceeded 
$5,000, increase by the number of levels from the 
                                                                                                             
in Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. ____, 133 S.Ct. 2072 
(2013), prohibiting as a violation of the Constitution‟s ex post 
facto clause the sentencing of a defendant under a guideline 
promulgated after the commission of the crime and 
recommending a higher sentencing range than the applicable 
guideline at the time of the crime, is inapplicable.  Nonetheless, 
we note that following the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, the guidelines were amended to provide: “If the offense 
involved an organized scheme to engage in insider trading and 
the offense level determined above is less than level 14, increase 
to level 14.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4(b)(2).  This guideline sentencing 
range increase reflects a continued push to ratchet up the 
penalties for insider trading.  The application note applying 
subsection (b)(2) states: “[A]n „organized scheme to engage in 
insider trading‟ means a scheme to engage in insider trading that 
involves considered, calculated, systematic, or repeated efforts 
to obtain and trade on inside information, as distinguished from 
fortuitous or opportunistic instances of insider trading.”  
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 cmt. n.1.        
   
  14 
table in § 2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and 
Fraud) corresponding to that amount. 
. . .  
  The commentary‟s application note 2 reads:  
Application of § 3B1.3.--Section 3B1.3 (Abuse of 
Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill) should be 
applied if the defendant occupied and abused a position 
of special trust.  Examples might include . . . an attorney 
who misused information regarding a planned but 
unannounced takeover attempt.      
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 cmt. n.2.   
  The commentary‟s background reads: 
. . . Insider trading is treated essentially as a sophisticated 
fraud.  Because the victims and their losses are difficult 
if not impossible to identify, the gain, i.e., the total 
increase in value realized through trading in securities by 
the defendant and persons acting in concert with the 
defendant or to whom the defendant provided inside 
information, is employed instead of the victims‟ losses.    
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 cmt. background (emphasis added).   
  The government relies on the commentary‟s plain 
language to support its argument that in a guidelines calculation 
Bauer‟s gains even when not shared with Kluger are attributable 
to Kluger.  In this regard it is significant that Kluger does not 
  15 
dispute either his role as the source of the information on which 
Bauer traded or the amount of Bauer‟s gains based on that 
information.  Rather, he counters that there is no support in the § 
2B1.4 commentary for a conclusion that the “gain” calculation is 
exempted from the application of the reasonable foreseeability 
test under § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) and that the District Court should 
have applied § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) to lessen the gains of the 
conspiracy attributable to Kluger.   
  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 states: 
(a) Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three 
(Adjustments).  Unless otherwise specified, (i) the base 
offense level where the guideline specifies more than one 
base offense level, (ii) specific offense characteristics 
and (iii) cross references in Chapter Two, and (iv) 
adjustments in Chapter Three, shall be determined on the 
basis of the following: 
(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, 
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, 
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; 
and 
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal 
activity (a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or 
enterprise undertaken by the defendant in 
concert with others, whether or not charged as 
a conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts 
and omissions of others in furtherance of the 
jointly undertaken criminal activity, 
  16 
that occurred during the commission of the 
offense of conviction, in preparation for that 
offense, or in the course of attempting to 
avoid detection or responsibility for that 
offense; . . . .   
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (emphasis added).  According to Kluger, the § 
2B1.4 commentary dealing with insider trading merely provides 
an overview of the importance of gain in the context of insider 
trading; it does not trigger the “[u]nless otherwise specified” 
exception to the application of § 1B1.3, a guidelines section that 
standing alone arguably could have resulted in Kluger having a 
lower offense level and thus a lower sentencing range than the 
range that the District Court applied in his sentencing.
12
  
Therefore, Kluger argues that the Court erred in not holding a 
presentence evidentiary hearing to determine whether he 
reasonably could have foreseen that Bauer would engage in his 
outsized trades inasmuch as he did not agree to the scale of 
those trades.   
  In United States v. Cespedes we explained that “[b]y 
including the phrase „unless otherwise specified,‟ the relevant 
conduct provision admits of exceptions to application of § 
1B1.3(a)(1)(B)‟s reasonable foreseeability test in certain 
instances.”  663 F.3d 685, 689 (3d Cir. 2011).  Cespedes, a case 
involving a prosecution following a three-man armed bank 
                                                 
12
 As we explain below even if we applied the foreseeability test 
as Kluger urges our result might be the same as that which we 
reach. 
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robbery, dealt with the application of an enhancement in 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for “recklessly creating a substantial risk of 
death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of 
fleeing from a law enforcement officer.”  663 F.3d at 686-87.  
Cespedes and Grant, two of the three conspirators, who were 
armed entered a bank while the third conspirator, Whitehurst, 
waited outside in a getaway car.  Cespedes flashed his weapon, 
and he and Grant removed the cash stolen in the robbery before 
exiting the bank and jumping into the car.  After Whitehurst 
drove from the bank the police attempted to make a traffic stop 
of the getaway car and a high-speed chase through residential 
neighborhoods ensued.  At some point, Cespedes and Grant 
jumped out of the car and fled on foot.  Whitehurst, however, 
continued on driving recklessly, nearly striking pedestrians 
before eventually hitting a parked minivan and then colliding 
with a police vehicle.  See id. at 687.   
  The applicable commentary to the sentencing 
enhancement explained that “the defendant is accountable for 
the defendant‟s own conduct and for conduct that the defendant 
aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or 
willfully caused.”  Id. at 689 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 cmt. n.5). 
 In overturning the district court‟s application of the 
enhancement, we explained that by “specifically describing” 
when the enhancement was applicable the guidelines based the 
enhancement on “something other than reasonable 
foreseeability,” and therefore created an exception to the 
application of § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B)‟s reasonable foreseeability test.  
Accordingly, the application of a reasonable foreseeability test 
impermissibly expanded the scope of the criminal acts 
attributable to Cespedes in direct contravention of the 
  18 
commentary to the enhancement guideline.   
  Kluger‟s case differs from Cespedes‟ because the 
application of the reasonable foreseeability test arguably 
impermissibly would constrict rather than expand Kluger‟s 
responsibility in possible contravention of the commentary to 
the insider-trading guideline.  But the key is not the distinction 
between expansion and constriction of responsibility but rather 
the application of the relevant commentary.  The plain language 
of the commentary‟s background to § 2B1.4 unequivocally 
attributes all of Bauer‟s gains to Kluger because Bauer was a 
“person[] acting in concert with the defendant,” as well as one 
“to whom the defendant provided inside information.”  U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.4 cmt. background.  Therefore, the insider-trading 
guideline falls under the “unless otherwise specified” exception 
of § 1B1.3, and, as a result, we will not use the reasonable 
foreseeability test in reviewing the District Court‟s calculation 
of the offense level and thus of the guidelines range in imposing 
a sentence on Kluger.
13
   
                                                 
13
 We are not suggesting that if we applied a reasonable 
foreseeability test to Kluger‟s conduct under U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.3(a)(1)(B), we would not hold him responsible for the 
profits that Bauer obtained.  Rather, we do not pass on this 
question.  Nevertheless, we observe that it is undisputed that 
Kluger passed inside information to Robinson with the intent 
that the information would reach Bauer who Kluger knew was a 
securities trader in order for Bauer to place illicit trades.  The 
District Court believed based on the facts in the record, 
including the logistics of the scheme and the taped conversations 
  19 
  The accompanying guideline to § 2B1.4, § 2B1.1 
(“Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft”) supports 
our result.  Section 2B1.1 includes a glossary of definitions one 
of which, “Actual Loss,” “means the reasonably foreseeable 
pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense” and “Reasonably 
Foreseeable Pecuniary Harm,” which “means pecuniary harm 
that the defendant knew or, under the circumstances, reasonably 
should have known, was a potential result of the offense.”  
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3.  The presence of this foreseeability 
language in § 2B1.1 demonstrates that the Sentencing 
Commission could have inserted an explicit foreseeability 
requirement in § 2B1.4 if it had wanted to do so.
14
  In the 
                                                                                                             
prior to Kluger‟s arrest, that it was reasonably foreseeable to 
him that Bauer would trade above and beyond any initially 
agreed on limit, assuming that an agreement limiting the number 
of shares to be traded was in place. 
 
14
 If Kluger had engaged in the commission of financial fraud 
other than insider trading, and the District Court had used § 
2B1.1 instead of § 2B1.4 in making its calculations, the § 1B1.3 
reasonable foreseeability provision might have been applicable 
in his sentencing.  In a recent decision by the Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit involving a pump-and-dump scheme, the 
court affirmed the attribution of the conspirators‟ profits after 
holding that the profits were reasonably foreseeable to the 
defendant.  See United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1164 
(10th Cir. 2013) (“As long as the gain of a co-conspirator is 
reasonably foreseeable, it can be attributed to a defendant.”) 
(citation omitted).  We, however, do not make a determination 
on that point because we are not dealing with a situation parallel 
  20 
circumstances we should not look beyond the plain language of 
§ 2B1.4 and read a foreseeability test into § 2B1.4.   
  In reaching our result, we are aware of certain widely 
publicized recent cases from other courts dealing with insider-
trading convictions that the parties on this appeal discuss in their 
briefs.  In United States v. Gupta the district court strictly relied 
on § 2B1.4 and its commentary for calculating gain in an 
insider-trading case even though the court believed that the 
guideline „“is not a model of clarity.”‟  904 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 
1184, 2012 WL 362031, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2012), aff‟d, 
No. 11-4416-cr, 2013 WL 3155848, ____ F.3d ____ (2d Cir. 
June 24, 2013)).
15
  In that case Rajat Gupta, a former Goldman 
                                                                                                             
to that in Gordon. 
       
15
 Our internal operating procedures provide that our not 
precedential opinions are not binding on panels in later cases in 
this Court.  See Chehazeh v. Attorney Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 127 
n.12 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Internal Operating Procedures 5.7 (3d 
Cir. 2010)).  Consequently, we surely are not bound by 
unpublished district court opinions from courts in other circuits. 
 But the parties have discussed Gupta and Rajaratnam and we do 
not think that we simply should ignore these cases.  
Furthermore, we find these insider-trading sentencing decisions 
from the Southern District of New York informative and 
persuasive and consider them in our discussion of the 
interpretation of the sentencing guidelines even though the 
parties only cite to them in their discussion of the “disparity” of 
defendants‟ sentences in insider-trading cases and the 
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Sachs director, was convicted of one count of conspiracy and 
three counts of securities fraud for providing material, nonpublic 
information to an investor, Raj Rajaratnam, the founder and 
head of the hedge fund Galleon Group.  The jury found that 
Gupta tipped Rajaratnam ahead of Warren Buffett‟s $5 billion 
infusion into Goldman Sachs and tipped him again in advance of 
Goldman‟s unexpected announcement of quarterly losses in 
2008.  Galleon‟s trades based on those tips led to an illicit 
“gain” of $5,032,195.  See Gupta, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 353.  In 
calculating Gupta‟s guideline range, the district court did not 
assess the extent to which the $5,032,195 figure was foreseeable 
to Gupta.
16
  In fact, the district court did not make any reference 
to foreseeability under § 1B1.3 even though Gupta, like Kluger, 
was a tipper.
17
 
                                                                                                             
application of the sentencing considerations set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
   
16
 Although the district court in Gupta granted a § 3553(a) 
variance based in part on the fact that Gupta did not derive any 
monetary gain from the information that he provided, the 
variance was an individualized decision that has no bearing on 
the underlying guidelines calculation for other defendants. 
 
17
 In United States v. Royer the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit applied a reasonable foreseeability test to a tipper in an 
insider-trading case.  549 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 2008).  The appeals 
court affirmed the district court‟s sentence predicated in part on 
the attribution to the appellant tipper of the acts of another 
defendant, the tippee, on the grounds “that the nature of [the 
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  In Rajaratnam, the district court also relied on the 
commentary to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 to calculate gain without 
addressing the foreseeability issue addressed in § 1B1.3.  See 
Rajaratnam, 2012 WL 362031.
18
  A jury convicted Rajaratnam 
                                                                                                             
tippee‟s] enterprise was evident to [the tipper] from his earliest 
involvement in it.”  Id. at 905.  Yet in Royer the gain calculation 
included trades stemming from securities fraud counts of which 
the tipper and tippee were acquitted.  And when the tippee 
became the tipper by providing insider information that he 
initially received to paying subscribers via his website, he was 
held responsible for their gains without any reference to 
reasonable foreseeability.  The court included the subscribers‟ 
trades in its calculation based on § 2B1.4‟s background 
commentary.  See id. at 904 („“Because the victims [of insider 
trading] and their losses are difficult if not impossible to 
identify, the gain, i.e., the total increase in value realized 
through trading in securities by the defendant and persons acting 
in concert with the defendant or to whom the defendant 
provided inside information, is employed instead of the victims‟ 
losses.”‟) (alteration and emphasis added in original) (citing 
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 cmt. background).        
 
18
 We reiterate that unpublished opinions are not binding on this 
Court, but we find the opinions we cite to be persuasive in our 
analysis in this case.  Furthermore, it is certainly appropriate to 
cite them in our disparity discussion as Kluger advances them in 
support of his appeal.  We also are aware that both Gupta and 
Rajaratnam have been appealed and that the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit has affirmed the conviction in 
Rajaratnam without addressing sentencing issues as the 
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on 14 counts of insider-trading crimes involving trades by 
Galleon.  Rajaratnam used inside information gathered from a 
number of sources to execute trades in publicly traded 
companies including Intel, Google, and Goldman Sachs.  As the 
tippee, Rajaratnam was not in a position parallel to that of 
Kluger.  Moreover, Rajaratnam occupied an unusual position as 
both a Galleon partner entitled to management fees and an 
investor entitled to a percentage of the gains.  Nonetheless, 
without any reference to foreseeability, the court explained in its 
detailed analysis of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 that the correct 
interpretation of the background commentary “include[s] gains 
from trading by „persons . . . to whom the defendant provided 
inside information‟ and thereby hold[s] tippers responsible for 
gains by their tippees.”  Id. at *15 (citing U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 cmt. 
background).           
          We agree with Rajaratnam and hold that the plain 
language of the background commentary to § 2B1.4 clearly 
indicates that Kluger can be held responsible for the full extent 
of Bauer‟s gains.  Bauer is explicitly an individual “to whom the 
defendant provided inside information.”19  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.4 
                                                                                                             
appellant in that case did not challenge his sentence on the 
appeal. 
 
19
 We are not concerned with the fact that Kluger directly 
provided the information to Robinson, who then provided the 
information to Bauer.  Kluger intended Bauer to be the ultimate 
tippee because Kluger knew that Robinson would not exercise 
the vast majority of the trades on behalf of the conspirators.  
 
  24 
cmt. background.  Therefore, Bauer‟s gains should be attributed 
to Kluger in their entirety, and the District Court needed to go 
no further in its calculations of the gain attributable to Kluger 
under § 2B1.4.
20
 
  Finally with respect to guidelines calculations, we note 
that we do not share the policy concerns that Kluger advances 
that a “sentence [of] an individual for unforeseeable conduct by 
a co-conspirator [] accomplish[es] no recognized penological 
aim.”  Appellant‟s br. at 30.  By punishing the conspirator who 
is the source of the information for all gains made by his co-
conspirators, we are reinforcing the deterrence message sent to 
would-be tippers by many courts.  Moreover, we are sending a 
clear warning to individuals, such as Kluger, who, in an attempt 
to limit their responsibility and the extent of their potential 
sentencing exposure allege that they had agreements with their 
co-conspirators to cap the illicit gains.  Would-be tippers will 
know that they cannot be certain that they will restrict their 
responsibility by coming to limiting agreements with their co-
conspirators prior to commission of their offenses and will come 
to realize the inherent risk in leaking inside information.  We 
also point out that both what we recognize was a long sentence 
that the Court imposed on Kluger and this opinion are likely to 
come to the attention of would-be insider traders who may be 
better educated and informed than persons engaging in other 
criminal activity, particularly inasmuch as insider-trading cases 
seem to be well publicized even in the general media. 
                                                 
20
 We also note that we are not faced with and therefore leave to 
another day whether this rationale applies outside the criminal 
context. 
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 2. Hearing, Objections and Discovery  
  When reviewing a district court‟s interpretation of the 
sentencing guidelines we exercise plenary review, but when 
reviewing a district court‟s application of the guidelines to the 
facts, we utilize an abuse of discretion deferential standard of 
review.  See Aquino, 555 F.3d at 127 n.5.  Kluger argues that 
the District Court denied him a presentence evidentiary hearing 
at which he could have addressed the foreseeability issue with 
respect to the scope of the agreement among the conspirators 
through direct testimony and cross-examination.
21
  At 
sentencing, Kluger explained that he did not stipulate to the total 
amount of “gain” because he expected to address that issue at 
the hearing that he contemplated the Court would conduct prior 
to his sentencing.  Kluger also argues that the Court failed to 
resolve his objections to the presentence report and also erred in 
not ordering discovery regarding information the government 
provided to the probation officer.  In particular, Kluger objected 
to the presentence report‟s characterization of the agreement 
among the conspirators and the portrayal of Kluger as the 
initiator of the conspiracy.   
  Under U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (emphasis added):  
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 We review a refusal to grant such an evidentiary hearing for 
abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Cantero, 995 F.2d 
1407, 1412 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).  The government 
put Robinson, the “middleman,” on notice that he might need to 
testify at Kluger‟s sentencing hearing, but the District Court 
determined that this testimony was not necessary because the 
Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing.     
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When any factor important to the sentencing 
determination is reasonably in dispute, the parties shall 
be given an adequate opportunity to present information 
to the court regarding that factor.  In resolving any 
dispute concerning a factor important to the sentencing 
determination, the court may consider relevant 
information without regard to its admissibility under the 
rules of evidence applicable at trial, provided that the 
information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support 
its probable accuracy.     
U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(b) provides that, “[t]he court shall resolve 
disputed sentencing factors at a sentencing hearing in 
accordance with Rule 32(i), Fed. R. Crim. P.”  Rule 32(i) 
(emphasis added) provides that at sentencing, the court: 
(A) must verify that the defendant and the defendant‟s 
attorney have read and discussed the presentence report 
and any addendum to the report;     
  . . .  
(C) must allow the parties‟ attorneys to comment on the 
probation officer‟s determinations and other matters 
relating to an appropriate sentence; and  
. . .  
 (2) The court may permit the parties to introduce evidence on 
the objections. . . .  
 (3) At sentencing, the court:  
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  . . .  
(B) must--for any disputed portion of the presentence 
report or other controverted matter--rule on the dispute or 
determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the 
matter will not affect sentencing, or because the court 
will not consider the matter in sentencing . . . . 
   a. Evidentiary Hearing 
 
  The District Court held an extensive sentencing hearing 
for Kluger in which the parties addressed the Court.  The 
sentencing guidelines and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
do not require that a district court conduct an evidentiary hearing 
in addition to a sentencing hearing at which the parties can be 
heard.  Thus, “[a]n evidentiary hearing need not be afforded on 
demand because there is no „right‟ to a hearing.”  United States 
v. Cantero, 995 F.2d 1407, 1413 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted); see also United States v. Real-Hernandez, 90 F.3d 356, 
362 (9th Cir. 1996) (“There is no general right to an evidentiary 
hearing at sentencing, and a district court has discretion to 
determine whether to hold such a hearing.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  In Cantero the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying the defendant in a drug conspiracy case an evidentiary 
hearing to contest the sentencing enhancement for his 
supervisory role in the conspiracy, even though the defendant 
argued that the determination of his role in the conspiracy raised 
a question of fact and that he needed to cross-examine his co-
conspirators so that the court could determine how to 
characterize his role.  In this regard, the defendant was given a 
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copy of the presentence report in advance of sentencing and the 
government and he submitted written memoranda on the issue.  
See Cantero, 995 F.2d at 1413.  The district court, after 
considering the materials submitted on the issue, held that the 
defendant was not a leader or organizer of the criminal activity 
but rather was a manager or supervisor of the activity.   
  In United States v. Collado, a case involving two brothers 
serving as heroin suppliers in a broader drug conspiracy, we 
remanded the case for resentencing because the district court 
failed to make any factual findings beyond those in the 
presentence report concerning the scope of their involvement.  
975 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1992).  We emphasized that when a 
district court is applying § 1B1.3 “a searching and 
individualized inquiry into the circumstances surrounding each 
defendant‟s involvement in the conspiracy is critical to ensure 
that the defendant‟s sentence accurately reflects his or her role.” 
 Id. at 995.   But in Collado the record was unclear as to when 
the brothers initially became involved in the conspiracy, and 
therefore the record did not clearly establish the date after which 
the brothers could be held accountable for the proceeds of the 
conspiracy.  See id. at 996.  There is, however, no uncertainty as 
to the time during which Kluger participated in the conspiracy in 
this case because the conspiracy could not have been carried out 
prior to his involvement inasmuch as he served as the source of 
the information that made the execution of the scheme possible.  
  In United States v. Rennert, building on Collado, we 
clarified that “[a]lthough we required individualized inquiry [in 
Collado], we did not impose an immutable requirement that the 
district court hold extensive hearings to make explicit, 
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particularized findings as to the exact date on which each 
defendant committed to the conspiracy or the precise contours of 
each conspirator‟s agreement.”  374 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir. 
2004), vacated in part on other grounds, Miller v. United States, 
544 U.S. 958, 125 S.Ct. 1744 (2005).  Consequently, we agree 
with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit “that § 6A1.3 
of the Guidelines requires the district court to provide a 
procedure — but not necessarily an evidentiary hearing — in 
which the parties may argue contested sentencing issues.”  
Cantero, 995 F.2d at 1413 (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 32(i)(2) (“The court may permit the parties to introduce 
evidence on the objections.”) (emphasis added).  Here, the 
extensive sentencing hearing before the District Court gave 
Kluger a sufficient opportunity to present his case.          
  In holding Kluger responsible for the profits from the 
insider trading under the plain language of § 2B1.4 in which 
foreseeability as Kluger raises the issue in this case is not an 
issue, we agree with the District Court that there was no need 
for an evidentiary hearing.  Kluger does not dispute the total 
amount gained by Bauer on which the District Court made its 
calculations and he does not deny that his tips to Bauer via 
Robinson made the gains possible.  No matter what the terms of 
the agreement among the conspirators, those terms would not 
have altered the fact that Kluger provided the information that 
reached Bauer via Robinson and made it possible for Bauer to 
make substantial gains by trading on that information.  
Furthermore, even if the foreseeability to Kluger of the extent of 
Bauer‟s trades had been an issue in Kluger‟s sentencing, as he 
claims it should have been, as the District Court explained, 
Kluger could not have “made one of his regular trips north to 
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pick up his cash proceeds, [and then] return[ed] back resting 
comfortably in the idea that nobody else had a dollar more than 
he did of gain.”  App. at 63.     
   b. Objections 
  In a May 25, 2012 letter to the District Court, Kluger 
complained that the presentence report did not adequately 
address his objections.  As noted above, Kluger objected to the 
characterization of the scheme, which he alleged was based on 
an underlying agreement regarding the division and targeted 
range of profits, thereby altering the calculation of the gains 
attributable to him and explaining the absence of a loss 
stipulation in the plea agreement.  Kluger also objected to the 
presentence report‟s description of him as the initiator of the 
scheme, a characterization that he would have attempted to rebut 
in testimony at a presentence evidentiary hearing.  The 
presentence report read: 
In the summer of 1994, Kluger, who was then in 
law school at NYU and working as a summer 
associate at Cravath [,Swaine & Moore], 
contacted Robinson and told him „I‟ve got 
something,‟ meaning that he had access to inside 
information through his employment at the law 
firm.  Kluger explained that he could learn of 
merger activity before the information was public 
through his work at the firm.  At Kluger‟s request, 
Robinson agreed to help find individuals willing 
to buy and sell stocks based on the inside 
information Kluger provided.  Robinson 
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approached Bauer, a professional stock trader and 
Robinson‟s friend, who agreed to trade based on 
the inside information provided by Kluger. 
PSR ¶ 34.  Kluger, however, proposed the following paragraph: 
Kluger and Robinson remained friends after their 
brief stint working together at the Manhattan real 
estate company, REQuest, and would speak on 
the phone from time to time.  In the summer of 
1994, Kluger was in law school at NYU and 
working as a summer associate at Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore.  In several telephone 
conversations in which Kluger and Robinson 
discussed each other‟s work and current lives, 
Robinson became aware that Kluger was working 
on potentially high profile [merger and 
acquisition] deals and that he was learning of 
merger activity before the information became 
public through his work at the firm.  Robinson 
then told Kluger about his friend Garrett Bauer, a 
professional stock trader and Robinson‟s friend.  
Robinson approached Bauer who agreed to trade 
based on the inside information provided by 
Kluger.  Kluger, Bauer and Robinson agreed that 
profits from any inside information provided by 
Kluger would be split equally among the three of 
them.  From the beginning of the scheme, Bauer 
did not honor his agreement to split profits 
equally among the three participants and, instead, 
kept the majority of the profits for himself.  
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Kluger was unaware that Bauer was trading over 
and above the amounts discussed between Kluger 
and Robinson. 
PSR ¶ 57.   
 The Probation Department, however, is not required to 
resolve all objections.  Following Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(g), the 
probation officer “submit[ted] to the court and to the parties the 
presentence report and an addendum containing any unresolved 
objections, the grounds for those objections, and the probation 
officer‟s comments on them.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(g). 
 In considering the presentence report the District Court 
complied with the applicable federal rules of criminal procedure. 
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) provides that the sentencing court 
“must--for any disputed portion of the presentence report or 
other controverted matter--rule on the dispute or determine that 
a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect 
sentencing, or because the court will not consider the matter in 
sentencing . . . .”  The District Court made its disposition with 
respect to the dispute concerning the existence of a limiting 
agreement among the conspirators by refusing to grant a hearing 
on the grounds that Kluger could not prove anything at the 
hearing that would impact on the Court‟s determination of his 
sentence.  The Court reached its conclusion as to how to proceed 
by relying on the plain language of § 2B1.4 and by taking into 
account its concern over the potential for unreliable testimony 
regarding the agreement.  At the sentencing hearing, the Court 
explained that it was “fully satisfied that the background note to 
the insider trading . . . guideline[] fully covers Mr. Bauer‟s 
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activities and Mr. Kluger‟s activities.  And that the gain 
attributable to Bauer‟s activities is attributable to Kluger in 
terms of the exposure to the guideline,” regardless of the 
existence of an agreement.  App. at 63.   
 Clearly, in Kluger‟s proposed changes to the presentence 
report quoted above he attempts to describe his role in the 
scheme in more benign terms than the report described his role.  
Thus, Kluger suggests that the presentence report should have 
recited that “Robinson became aware,” of Kluger‟s access to 
inside information whereas the report states that Kluger directly 
contacted Robinson and informed him that he had access to 
inside information.  The presentence report also states that 
Kluger asked Robinson to locate an individual capable of 
executing the trades on their behalf whereas Kluger claims that 
Robinson told him about Bauer and approached Bauer on his 
own.   
 Kluger concedes that he did not object to the presentence 
report at sentencing but attributes his failure to object to his 
expectation that the Court would resolve factual disputes at the 
evidentiary hearing that he contemplated that the Court would 
hold before imposing sentence.  Kluger argues that even though 
the District Court did not directly address his alleged initiating 
role in the scheme, the Court could not have failed to consider it. 
 Kluger, however, is in no position to make assumptions as to 
what the District Court did or did not take into consideration in 
rendering its sentence.  Ultimately, Kluger was the source of the 
information that Bauer used to make his trades; the 
identification of the originator of the underlying scheme was of 
minimal significance in view of the circumstance that Kluger 
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was a full participant in the conspiracy, and therefore an inquiry 
into the originator of the scheme did not merit an individualized 
sentencing hearing.   
   c. Discovery 
 
  Kluger claims that there are materials, including recorded 
conversations and emails, that would prove that there was an 
agreement among the three conspirators regarding the limits of 
the insider-trading scheme.
22
  He maintains that the government 
violated his due process rights by not supplying to him all of the 
materials that it provided to the probation office which he argues 
functions as “an independent arm of the court,” not as “an arm 
of the government.”  Appellant‟s br. at 57.  But Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32, which deals with presentence reports does not provide for 
such broad discovery with respect to presentence materials.  
Rather, Rule 32(e)(2), requires that the probation officer give 
the report itself to the defendant, the defendant‟s counsel, and a 
government attorney at least 35 days prior to sentencing unless 
the defendant waives the time requirement.  Rule 32(f) provides 
that the parties have 14 days to object in writing and to provide 
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 In particular, Kluger maintains that he should have received 
tapes/transcripts of Robinson‟s post-arrest conversations with 
Bauer.  We believe he is referring to the conversations between 
Robinson and Bauer following Robinson‟s decision to cooperate 
with the government.  The presentence report provides a 
detailed overview of those conversations.  We are not aware of 
any communications between Bauer and Robinson after their 
arrests on the charges involved in this case.       
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those objections to the probation officer and to the opposing 
party.  The probation officer then may meet with the parties to 
review their objections.  See Rule 32(f)(3).  At least seven days 
before sentencing, the probation officer must provide the report 
and related objections to the court and parties.
23
  See Rule 32(g). 
 Thus, Rule 32 did not require that Kluger be given the 
discovery that he sought.   
  In any event, even if the rules provided that such 
discovery materials should have been supplied, Kluger does 
nothing more than speculate with respect to the existence of 
such materials, especially in the absence of any indication that 
the government failed to comply with the rule‟s disclosure 
requirements that should be made.  The government counters 
that it already disclosed all of the information, such as the 
transcripts and copies of the calls that Robinson covertly 
recorded, and, at sentencing, the District Court accepted the 
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 The only additional disclosure occurs at sentencing when the 
court “must give to the defendant and an attorney for the 
government a written summary of--or summarize in camera--any 
information excluded from the presentence report under Rule 
32(d)(3) on which the court will rely in sentencing, and give 
them a reasonable opportunity to comment on that information.” 
 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i).  Rule 32(d)(3) requires the presentence 
report to exclude: “(A) any diagnoses that, if disclosed, might 
seriously disrupt a rehabilitation program; (B) any sources of 
information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality; and (C) 
any other information that, if disclosed, might result in physical 
or other harm to the defendant or others.”    
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government‟s assertion.24   
  3. Reasonableness  
 
  We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness 
of the sentence for abuse of discretion.  See United States v. 
Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  
“At both [the procedural and substantive] stages of our review, 
the party challenging the sentence has the burden of 
demonstrating unreasonableness.”  United States v. Tomko, 562 
F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation omitted)).  
   a. Procedural Reasonableness 
 In the wake of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
125 S.Ct. 738, we have instructed district courts to adhere to a 
three-step sentencing process.  See Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247.  
First, the district “[c]ourts must continue to calculate a 
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 The government indicates in its brief that the only information 
that it provided to the probation office that it did not provide to 
Kluger were copies of his personnel files from his employment 
at the law firms where he obtained inside information.  These 
files provided the support for the parts of the presentence report 
outlining the dates of his employment, his salary, and the 
training he received.  But the government contends that Kluger 
had independent access to these files.  Moreover, with or 
without such access to the files Kluger surely had the 
information that the files contained with respect to his salary, 
training, and dates of employment and he knew that the firms 
gave him instructions with respect to insider trading.   
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defendant‟s Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have 
before Booker.”  United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221, 225 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (footnote, internal quotation marks, and citations 
omitted).  Second, “they must formally rule on the motions of 
both parties and state on the record whether they are granting a 
departure and how that departure affects the Guidelines 
calculation, and take into account our Circuit‟s pre-Booker case 
law, which continues to have advisory force.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  Third, the district courts 
“are to exercise their discretion by considering the relevant § 
3553(a) factors . . . in setting the sentence they impose 
regardless whether it varies from the sentence calculated under 
the Guidelines.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  In order to satisfy step three, “[t]he record must 
disclose meaningful consideration of the relevant statutory 
factors and the exercise of independent judgment, based on a 
weighing of the relevant factors, in arriving at a final sentence.” 
 United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571-72 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citation omitted).  In accordance with Gunter, the District Court 
calculated that Kluger had an adjusted offense level of 33 and a 
sentencing range of 135-168 months.  After reviewing the 
applicable § 3553(a) factors, the District Court sentenced Kluger 
to a custodial term of 144 months, in the middle of his 
guidelines range.    
 We focus our review on Kluger‟s challenge to the District 
Court‟s application of step three of the sentencing process.  
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court should impose a 
sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to 
comply with the purposes discussed in the second criterion 
below.  In particular, the court should consider: 
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(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
history and characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-- 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for the law, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense;   
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant; and  
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner;  
  (3) the kinds of sentences available; 
  (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range 
                           established for-- 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by 
the applicable category of defendant as set forth in 
the guidelines-- 
. . .  
  (5) any pertinent policy statement-- 
        (A) issued by the Sentencing Commission   
  39 
                                  . . .  
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct; and   
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the     
      offense.   
  The sentencing court “meaningful[ly] consider[s]” the 
factors by “acknowledg[ing] and respond[ing] to any properly 
presented sentencing argument which has colorable legal merit 
and a factual basis.”  United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 
(3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Yet the court does not need to “discuss and make findings as to 
each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court 
took the factors into account in sentencing.”  United States v. 
Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  After considering the factors, the 
District Court imposed a custodial sentence within the 
guidelines sentencing range of 144 months on Kluger, which, as 
we have indicated, was the longest insider-trading sentence in 
history.  But as we noted in Cooper, „“reasonableness is a range, 
not a point.”‟  United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 n.11 
(3d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by 
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007). 
  Kluger argues that the District Court focused on “the 
seriousness of the offense” (§ 3553(a)(2)(A)) and on 
“afford[ing] adequate deterrence” (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)) to the 
exclusion of other factors, such as the “nature and circumstances 
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of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant” (§ 3553(a)(1)).  According to Kluger, “the judge 
essentially did no more than mechanically recite the statutory 
words, rather than applying them to the defendant at hand.”  
Appellant‟s br. at 41-42 (internal citation omitted).  The Court, 
however, engaged in a thorough discussion of the 
“circumstances of the offense,” such as the 17-year duration of 
the conspiracy and the fact that the conspirators continued the 
scheme even after learning of investigations by regulators on 
two separate occasions.
25
  The Court, which has the discretion to 
determine the extent to which each factor merits discussion, also 
addressed “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 
such as Kluger‟s loving and supportive family, privileged 
childhood, and the ability of the Bureau of Prisons to manage 
his poor health during his incarceration.
26
  See United States v. 
King, 604 F.3d 125, 144 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).   
     Kluger focuses his appeal on what he perceives was the 
vast disparity between his sentence and that of his co-
conspirator Bauer as well as the sentences of other defendants 
convicted of insider trading throughout the country, particularly 
in the Southern District of New York, quite naturally the venue 
                                                 
25
 Although the District Court did not directly discuss the need 
to protect the public from Kluger, it addressed the harmful 
impact of insider trading on the broader public. 
 
26
 Kluger also presented to the District Court that he is gay but 
separated from his former partner and that he and his former 
partner care for their three children including one with an autism 
spectrum disorder. 
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for numerous insider-trader prosecutions.  Under § 3553(a)(6), a 
sentencing judge considers “the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who 
have been found guilty of similar conduct.”  Courts apply § 
3553(a)(6) to compare sentences between co-defendants or 
among defendants in separate cases, as long as the “defendants 
are similarly situated.”  King, 604 F.3d at 145 (citations 
omitted).  Section 3553(a) “does not require district courts to 
consider sentencing disparity among co-defendants,” but “it also 
does not prohibit them from doing so.”  United States v. Parker, 
462 F.3d 273, 277 (3d Cir. 2006).  Bauer, Kluger‟s co-
conspirator, netted gains many times larger than those that 
Kluger obtained from the conspiracy but the Court nevertheless 
sentenced Bauer to a nine-year custodial term at the bottom of 
his guidelines range.  The Court, on the other hand, sentenced 
Kluger to a 144-month custodial sentence, a term in the middle 
of his guidelines range.   
  Though there is an obvious disparity between Kluger‟s 
and Bauer‟s sentences there was a good reason for the District 
Court to have imposed a longer sentence on Kluger than on 
Bauer.  In this regard, we cannot overlook the circumstance that 
Kluger served as the source of the information that permitted the 
scheme to function.  Furthermore, Kluger was an attorney who 
took an oath to uphold the law.  Moreover, it is really quite 
remarkable that Kluger could not even wait to graduate from 
law school before using his employment at a law firm to initiate 
his illegal activities and it is equally remarkable that during most 
of his legal career he was involved in criminal activity, so that in 
an actual though perhaps not in a legal technical sense as the 
term is used in the sentencing guidelines, he truly was a career 
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criminal.  Furthermore, the presentence report makes clear that 
Kluger had a legitimate income well into six figures from his 
employment at various law firms, an income that should have 
made it seem less urgent to him to enhance by criminal activity.  
On the other hand, it is significant that Bauer had engaged in 
extensive community service work pre- and post-arrest that 
helped justify the within-guidelines sentence at the lower end of 
his range.  In any event, Bauer and Kluger both received within-
guidelines sentences, and such sentences generally do not lead to 
disparities requiring that a defendant be granted relief because 
“avoidance of unwarranted disparities was clearly considered by 
the Sentencing Commission when setting the Guidelines 
ranges.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 54, 128 S.Ct. 586, 
599 (2007).   
  The District Court informed the parties at sentencing that 
it had examined a number of other insider-trading cases and 
recognized “that right now sentencing judges have expressed 
some dismay over the guidelines sentences applicable to some 
defendants.”27  App. at 87.  The Court specifically mentioned 
the case of Winifred Jiau, who worked for a Silicon Valley 
expert network and was convicted of leaking secret information 
about tech companies to traders at hedge funds.  See United 
States v. Jiau, 794 F. Supp. 2d 484, 485 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  
Her sentencing guideline range amounted to six-and-a-half to 
                                                 
27
 The District Court even mentioned Morrison & Foerster‟s 
2011 Insider Trading Annual Review cited by defense counsel 
as evidence of the widespread use of downward variances in 
such sentences.   
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eight years, but the district court nevertheless sentenced her to 
four years in prison.  The sentencing court in the Jiau case 
explained: “There‟s no way that I‟m going to impose a guideline 
sentence in this case [because] the guidelines give a mirage of 
something that can be obtained with arithmetic certainty.”  App. 
at 87 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28
  But at Kluger‟s 
sentencing, the District Court distinguished between the Jiau 
case and Kluger‟s case.  The overall profit attributed to Jiau‟s 
information was only $2.5 million, and the Jiau court exercised 
its discretion to sentence her based strictly on what she obtained 
from her offense.
29
  On the other hand, in Kluger‟s case, the 
District Court found that “unlike the sentenc[es] where judges 
have seen no real connection between the guidelines driven by 
the amount of gain and the conduct of the individual defendant 
before [them],” there was no such disconnect in Kluger‟s case.  
Id. at 96.           
  Moving beyond Jiau, the District Court explained that 
many of the other below-guidelines sentences stemmed from 
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 See Walter Pavlo, Winifred Jiau Gets 4 Years in Prison, And 
What a Journey, Forbes (Sept. 21, 2011, 6:48 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2011/09/21/winifred-
jiau-gets-4-years-in-prison-and-what-a-journey/. 
 
29
 Though we use the term “only” in describing a profit of $2.5 
million we do so because we are comparing $2.5 million to the 
sometimes far greater illegal gains involved in other so-called 
white collar criminal cases.  Ordinarily, we, like most people, 
would not refer to $2.5 million as a small sum as to us, like most 
people, it is a lot of money.   
  44 
agreements between the government and the defendant.  For 
example, the Court discussed the case of Joseph “Chip” 
Skowron, who faced a guidelines range of 87-108 months but 
struck an agreement with the government pursuant to which the 
government recommended that the court impose a 60-month 
custodial sentence on him.  The Court also discussed what it 
characterized as “the very notorious case” of Raj Rajaratnam 
that we addressed above in our discussion of Kluger‟s 
sentencing range.  Rajaratnam, 2012 WL 362031.  On May 11, 
2011, a jury in the Southern District of New York convicted 
Rajaratnam on 14 counts of conspiracy and securities fraud, in a 
scheme that netted in excess of $60 million.  Though 
Rajaratnam faced an applicable guidelines range of 235-293 
months, the court sentenced him to a custodial term of 132 
months in spite of the government‟s portrayal of him as the 
modern face of insider trading.  The District Court here 
differentiated between Rajaratnam and Kluger on the grounds 
that in the latter‟s case, the “conduct [was] not just a trade, not 
just a series of trades over one company . . . [b]ut 17 years of 
trades and money laundering and obstruction of justice.”  App. 
at 90.  By drawing the distinction, the Court not only 
demonstrated why Kluger was not similarly situated to 
Rajaratnam but also demonstrated that it took Kluger‟s 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) arguments into consideration.
30
     
                                                 
30
 We do not mean to suggest that defendants must have 
identical backgrounds to merit comparison under § 3553(a)(6).  
Yet we reiterate the explanation that we gave in United States v. 
Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 91 (3d Cir. 2008), in which we rejected 
the defendant‟s § 3553(a)(6) argument: “That [defendant] can 
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   Unfortunately for Kluger, the District Court found that 
his actions constituted “a more thuggish, more direct example of 
taking other people‟s stuff.  And at [the] same time for all its 
acridity, a highly successful scheme because of the money 
laundering.  Because of the simplicity, because of the limited 
number of people involved in it.  Because of the discipline.”  
App. at 90.  The Court added: “I don‟t know any of the other 
defendants who are accused of individual trades. . . . Not a 
pattern of how one runs a hedge fund but individual trades.  I 
haven‟t seen any of them with this number of trades.  And this 
consistency of engaging in insider information.”  Id. at 97.  
Moreover, the Court differentiated between Kluger and other 
lawyers who have been convicted of insider trading: “[T]he 
lawyers who have otherwise been prosecuted did not perform[] 
the kind of [wholesale] purloining of information on a regular 
and steady basis . . . .”  Id. 
  In the end, “[t]he touchstone of „reasonableness‟ is 
whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful 
consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 
 Grier, 475 F.3d at 571 (footnote and citations omitted).  We 
find that the record more than meets that requirement, especially 
                                                                                                             
find another case where a defendant charged with a somewhat 
similar crime and facing the same advisory sentencing range 
received a sentence outside of the applicable sentencing range 
does not make [defendant‟s] within-Guidelines sentence 
unreasonable.  If that were the law, any sentence outside of the 
Guidelines range would set precedent for all future similarly 
convicted defendants.  This is not, and cannot be, the law.”   
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because we “„give due deference to the district court‟s 
determination that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole,‟ justify the 
sentence.”31  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (citations omitted).  As 
long as “the district court‟s sentence is procedurally sound, we 
will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the 
reasons the district court provided.”  Id.  Here, we do not find 
that no other reasonable sentencing court would have imposed 
the sentence. 
  b. Substantive Reasonableness 
  Once we are satisfied, as we are here, that a district court 
did not commit procedural error, we review the sentence for 
substantive reasonableness.  See United States v. Negroni, 638 
F.3d 434, 443 (3d Cir. 2011).  As noted above, the District Court 
imposed a within the guidelines custodial sentence of 144 
months, and therefore we take into account our recognition that 
“[a] sentence that falls within the recommended Guidelines 
range, while not presumptively reasonable, is less likely to be 
unreasonable than a sentence outside the range.”  United States 
v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 204 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 
  Kluger‟s focus on the procedural aspects of the sentence 
offers little in the way of substantive argument regarding what 
                                                 
31
 “[T]he district court‟s superior vantage point compels us to 
give due deference to [its] determination that the § 3553(a) 
factors, on a whole, justify the sentence.”  United States v. 
Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010) (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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he believes was the District Court‟s “draconian sentence.”  
Appellant‟s br. at 46.  He provides an overview of mitigating 
factors that echoes the arguments under § 3553(a)(1) that we 
already have discussed regarding his history and characteristics. 
 Kluger reiterates his argument that the sentence is particularly 
unreasonable as compared to that imposed on Bauer, who 
reaped millions more in profits and yet received a custodial 
sentence of 108 months at the bottom of his guidelines range 
which was shorter than that imposed on Kluger.  Yet Kluger‟s 
argument does not give adequate attention to the circumstance 
that he received a two-level sentencing enhancement for abusing 
his position of trust as an attorney and did not perform a 
commensurate level of community service pre- and post-arrest 
as did Bauer, thereby qualifying Kluger for a higher guideline 
range and justifying his mid-range sentence.   
  After reiterating the § 3553(a) factors, Kluger summarily 
concludes that his sentence fails the test of substantive 
reasonableness and then quotes from Judge Fisher‟s dissent in 
Tomko to support his position that: “[I]f substantive 
reasonableness review is to mean anything, courts of appeals 
must attempt to give content to this component of our review 
until the Supreme Court provides further guidance.”  Tomko, 
562 F.3d at 591 (Fisher, J., dissenting).  But the concern that 
Judge Fisher expressed in his Tomko dissent is certainly not a 
concern here.  We do not doubt that Kluger received a fairly 
severe sentence as compared to Bauer and to other defendants in 
insider-trading cases who were convicted in the Southern 
District of New York.  Yet we do not exercise plenary review 
when examining the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, 
and the District Court set forth adequate reasons “to satisfy [us] 
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that [it] considered the parties‟ arguments and [had] a reasoned 
basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.”  
Merced, 603 F.3d at 215-16 (citing Rita v. United States, 551 
U.S. 338, 356, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468  (2007)).  Furthermore, 
„“[t]he fact that [we] might reasonably have concluded that a 
different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify 
reversal of the district court.”‟  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 560 (citation 
omitted).
32
  The District Court was in a superior position than 
we are to make the sentencing determination in this case, and we 
afford great deference to its decision.  Kluger, as the challenging 
party, fails to meet his burden to overcome the deference that we 
owe the District Court‟s determinations and we cannot say that 
“no reasonable sentencing court” would have imposed the same 
sentence that it imposed.  Consequently, we will not disturb the 
sentence on the grounds that it was substantially unreasonable.  
See id. at 568.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence entered June 4, 2012.  
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 We are not implying that if we had imposed the sentence in 
the first instance that we might have imposed a shorter sentence. 
 We simply are making it clear that even if we would have done 
so that circumstance would not require that we reverse here. 
